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LABOR ORGANIZING BY EXECUTIVE
ORDER:  GOVERNOR SPITZER AND THE
UNIONIZATION OF HOME-BASED
CHILD DAY-CARE PROVIDERS
David L. Gregory*
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 8, 2007, New York Governor Eliot Spitzer issued Exec-
utive Order No. 12, opening the door for the unionization of 60,000
persons paid directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by state
funds, to provide home-based day-care for the children of working
parents.1
The Governor’s action was dramatic, stark, and extraordinarily
significant.  Rather than wait for the New York State Assembly
and Senate to reenact legislation previously vetoed by former Gov-
ernor Pataki in 2006,  Governor Spitzer used the prerogative of the
executive order to cut through many Gordian knots.2
Meanwhile, powerful unions have carved up the organizing turf:
the United Federation of Teachers (“UFT”) is successfully organiz-
ing home-based providers in New York City, and the Civil Service
Employees Association (“CSEA”) will organize those providers
throughout the rest of the state.3
Critics of the Governor’s initiative vociferously contend that it is
a blatant legal fiction to characterize these providers as employees.
This legal fiction, however, is certainly more enlightened than the
* David L. Gregory is the Dorothy Day Professor of Law, St. John’s University,
Jamaica, Queens, New York; B.A., 1973, The Catholic University of America;
M.B.A., 1977, Wayne State University; J.D., 1980, University of Detroit; LL.M., 1982,
and J.S.D., 1987, Yale University.  Nathaniel Leung Eichler and Emmanuel Ruiz, St.
John’s Law Class of 2008, and, especially, Edward McNamara, St. John’s Law Class of
2009, performed extraordinary, superb research  in the preparation of this Article.  St.
John’s provided a summer research grant.
1. See Steven Greenhouse, Child Care Workers in New York City Vote to Union-
ize, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, at B4, [hereinafter Greenhouse, Vote to Unionize]
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/24/nyregion/24childcare.htm.
2. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 12, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 6.12 (2007),
[hereinafter N.Y. Exec. Order No. 12] available at http://www.ny.gov/governor/execu-
tive_orders/exeorders/12.pdf.
3. See Greenhouse, Vote to Unionize, supra note 1. R
277
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-2\FUJ202.txt unknown Seq: 2  3-MAR-08 9:41
278 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXV
perpetuation of the long-standing arrangement that relegates these
providers to the economic margins.4
The child-care industry has more workers with earnings falling
below the poverty line than any other industry, with over fifty per-
cent of providers earning at the poverty level.5  They are also over-
whelmingly women of color.6  Meanwhile, these providers of day
care for children furnish an indispensable service to the working-
parent cornerstone of the economy.  In addition, “from 1947 to
2004, the labor force participation rate of mothers with children
between six and seventeen years climbed from roughly twenty-five
percent to more than seventy-seven percent.”7
By some economic measures, these essential service providers
are very much employees.8  But, employees of whom?  Are the
4. Home-based day-care providers in New York City earn less than $20,000 an-
nually. See Steven Greenhouse, Providers of Child Care May Now Vote on Unioniz-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007, at B4 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Providers May Vote];
see also Alair Townsend, Cost of Unionized Babysitters Is High, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS.,
May 28, 2007, at 13.
5. In some cities, providers earn as little as $2.39 per hour. See Peggie R. Smith,
Welfare, Child Care, and the People Who Care:  Union Representation of Family Child
Care Providers, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 321, 333, 338 (2007) [hereinafter Smith, Family
Child Care Providers]; see also Peggie R. Smith, Caring for Paid Caregivers:  Linking
Quality Child Care with Improved Working Conditions, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 399, 405-06
(2004) [hereinafter Smith, Quality Child Care].
6. See Smith, Quality Child Care, supra note 5, at 401.  Professor Smith’s leading R
articles present a critical analysis of feminist and racial issues arising from the legal
regime that had summarily denied these poor women of color the protections of the
labor and employment laws.
7. Smith, Family Child Care Providers, supra note 5, at 325. R
8. Courts have developed different tests to determine whether an individual is an
employee or an independent contractor.  The predominant tests are the common law
agency test, the economic realities test, and a test that combines the common law
standard with the economic realities test, known as the hybrid test.  The Supreme
Court described the common law agency test in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992):  “[I]n determining whether a hired party is an
employee, [the Court considers] the hiring party’s right to control the manner and
means by which the product is accomplished is considered . . . .”  The Court looks at
various factors that are relevant to this inquiry, such as the skill required, the source
of instrumentalities and tools, the location of the work, the duration of the relation-
ship between the parties, whether the hiring party has the right to assign projects to
the hired party, the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to
work, the method of payment, the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants,
whether the work is part of the general business of the hiring party, whether the
hiring party is in business, the provision of employee benefits, and the tax treatment
of the hired party.  The economic reality test examines the employer-employee rela-
tionship based on employee dependence on the business to which he or she renders
services.  Courts look at a number of factors to determine if the worker is in fact an
employee under this test.  Such factors are:  the nature and degree of control, the
alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss, the alleged employee’s investment
in equipment or materials required for the task, the degree of skill required to per-
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parents and guardians of the children consigned to the care of
these providers their employers?  No.  Rather, by operation of Ex-
ecutive Order No. 12, it is the State—but the State as employer in
very important, and yet very limited, ways.9
At the federal level, the past term of the United States Supreme
Court was decidedly adverse to the interests of low-wage work-
ers.10  In Long Island Care at Home v. Coke, the Court unani-
mously ruled that domestic workers, including the home health
workers employed by third parties, were not protected by the fed-
eral minimum wage law, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and thus
had no federal claim for overtime pay at a premium rate.11  At the
same time, 2007 witnessed the dawn of significant promise for an
important component of workers on the economic margins in New
York.12  At least in part, these initiatives may represent a response
to the erosion of labor protections or the lack of hope in improving
labor rights at the federal level.
This Article discusses Governor Spitzer’s May 8, 2007 executive
order as well as earlier legislative and executive initiatives in New
York and other states to provide organizing rights to groups of
workers paid through state funds.  In particular, it looks at Califor-
nia’s analogous initiative via legislation, Governor Pataki’s veto of
similar legislation in 2006, executive orders of Illinois, Oregon,
Iowa, and New Jersey governors, organizing initiatives by major
unions, their likely consequences, and some implications for future
innovations in organizing.
form the task, the degree of permanency and duration of the working relationship,
and the extent to which the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged em-
ployer’s business.  The hybrid test combines elements of both the common law agency
test and the economic reality test.  Courts have yet to completely agree upon a fixed
test.  Courts continue to exercise discretion in combining elements from both tests
and applying the test to fit the situation at hand.  For a recent outstanding overview of
these various tests, see Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Our Nation’s Forgotten Workers:  The
Unprotected Volunteers, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 147, 161-70 (2006).  I previously
analyzed these tests in David L. Gregory, The Problematic Employment Dynamics of
Student Internships, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 227, 233-37 (1998);
David L. Gregory & William T. Leder, Employee or Independent Contractor? Viz-
caino v. Microsoft Corporation, 47 LAB. L.J. 749 (1996).
9. See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 12, supra note 2. R
10. See Long Island Care at Home v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2351-52 (2007).
11. See id.
12. See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 12, supra note 2.
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II. UNIONIZATION OF HOME-CARE AND CHILD-CARE
WORKERS IN OTHER STATES
A. The California Precursor
One of the most significant gains in union membership in fifty
years occurred in 1999, when over 70,000 home-care workers voted
to join the Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”) in
Los Angeles.13  This successful organizational drive had its genesis
in the 1980s, when SEIU and the American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”) began attempts
to organize these home-care workers,14  with Los Angeles as the
epicenter for particularly intense grassroots organizing.15
The core legal problem confronting the home-care workers was
their ambiguous and problematic employment status.  California
used a state agency, the In-Home Supportive Services (“IHSS”), to
administer state monies for home care.16  California argued that
the workers are independent contractors, employed by the elderly
and the disabled,17 even though the state paid “the workers’ wages
and unemployment and disability insurance.”18  Without an em-
ployer, there was no employer entity with whom the union could
purport to effectively negotiate.19
In April 1988, workers demanded recognition of their SEIU Lo-
cal 434, and sought Los Angeles County’s acknowledgement of its
status as their official employer.20  The SEIU began negotiating
with the Los Angeles county government, but in January 1989, Cal-
ifornia refused to recognize a collective bargaining agreement that
had been reached by Los Angeles County and SEIU Local 434.21
The union filed suit in California state court, demanding enforce-
13. Nancy Cleeland, Home-care Workers’ Vote for Union a Landmark for Labor,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1999, at 1; Steven Greenhouse, In Biggest Drive Since 1937,
Union Gains a Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1999, at A1 [hereinafter Greenhouse,
Union Gains a Victory].
14. Linda Delp & Katie Quan, Homecare Worker Organizing in California:  An
Analysis of a Successful Strategy, 27 LAB. STUD. J. 1, 5 (2002).
15. Id. at 6.
16. Id. at 3.
17. See Harry Bernstein, Home Care Providers’ Hurdle:  Pinning Down Employ-
ers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1987, at 4.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. Bob Pool, Faithful Rally Across the U.S. to Keep Dream Alive, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 1988, at 1.
21. Serv. Employees Int’l Union Local 434 v. County of L.A., 275 Cal. Rptr. 508,
510 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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ment of the agreement.22  In February 1989, the court ruled against
the union,23  and the California Court of Appeal upheld the ruling
on appeal.24  Restating the decision of the trial court, the Court
found that because the county exercised little control over the
home-care workers they could not be considered public employ-
ees.25  As a result, the SEIU’s initial legal attempt to force the
county to bargain with them was judicially roadblocked.26
Nevertheless, the union continued to endeavor to organize
home-care workers throughout California.  Lobbying led to the
passage of bills that authorized the creation of county level public
authorities.27  These public authorities acted as employers of record
with whom the unions could negotiate.28  Section 12302.25 of the
California Welfare & Institutions Code mandated that the counties
act as, or establish, employer entities, subject to state labor laws by
2003, and expressly stated that the employer established by the
county could collectively bargain with the home-care workers.29
Over the course of the 1990s, the California counties created
such authorities, enabling the home-care workers to collectively
bargain and secure labor contracts, which culminated in the suc-
cessful unionization of over 70,000 Los Angeles home-care workers
in early 1999.30
Meanwhile, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations (“AFL-CIO”) was splintered by the for-
mation of the Change to Win coalition led by SEIU President
Andy Stern, spurring intense organizational rivalry between the
AFL’s AFSCME and Change to Win’s SEIU.31  A developing
22. See id.
23. Id. at 511.
24. Id. at 515.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 12301.6, 12302, 12302.25 (West 2007); Delp
& Quan, supra note 14, at 9; see also Candace Howes, Upgrading California’s Home R
Care Workforce:  The Impact of Political Action and Unionization, in THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA LABOR 75 (Univ. of Cal. Inst. for Labor & Employment 2004), available
at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=ile.
28. See Delp & Quan, supra note 14, at 9; see also Howes, supra note 27. R
29. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12302.25(b) and CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3507 are
the state labor laws to which home-care workers are subject, including a ban on the
right to strike.
30. See Delp & Quan, supra note 14, at 11. R
31. See Stephen Franklin, Service Workers Union Wins Child-care Organizing
Rights, CHI. TRIB., May 26, 2005, at C1 (discussing the SEIU’s securing of the right to
organize child-care workers over AFSCME in Illinois); Barbara Rose, AFL-CIO Rift
Turns Allies Into Enemies, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 14, 2005, at C1 (describing the raiding,
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AFSCME-SEIU conflict was resolved in September 2005, which
led to the creation of the Pennsylvania and California-based
United Child Care Union (“UCCU”).32  The UCCU supported
California legislation that would permit all child-care workers to
unionize and collectively bargain,33 as section 12302.25 of the Cali-
fornia Welfare & Institutions Code granted collective bargaining
rights to home health-care workers, but did not provide similar
rights to child-care workers.34  Governor Schwarzenegger, how-
ever, vetoed the legislation supported by the UCCU in September
2006 claiming that unionization and collective bargaining would
strain the state budget and “make child-care too costly for low-
income families that are not receiving child-care subsidies.”35  As-
sembly Bill 1164 would allow child-care providers to choose union
representation.36  This bill is currently before Governor
Schwarzenegger, having passed the California Assembly and Sen-
ate in early September 2007.37
B. Earlier Executive Orders
Before Governor Spitzer signed Executive Order No. 12, five
other governors signed analogous orders permitting the unioniza-
tion or organization of child-care workers.  The first among these
was Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich who issued Executive Or-
der 2005-1 on February 18, 2005.38  The executive order permitted
49,000 child-care providers to bargain with the state through a
propaganda, and intense campaigning between the SEIU and AFSCME in California
over home care and in Illinois over child-care workers).
32. See DEBORAH CHALFIE ET AL., GETTING ORGANIZED:  UNIONIZING HOME-
BASED CHILD CARE PROVIDERS 22 (Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr. 2007), available at http://
www.nwlc.org/pdf/GettingOrganized2007.pdf; see also United Child Care Union,
http://www.uccunion.org/ (last visited on Jan. 18, 2008).
33. See Press Release, Assemb. Kevin de Leo´n, Assistant Majority Leader Kevin
de Leo´n’s Legislation to Extend Organizing Rights to Child Care Workers Passes Out
of Policy Committee (Apr. 18, 2007), http://democrats.assembly.ca.gov/members/a45/
pdf/20070418AD45PR02.pdf.
34. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12302.25 (West 2007).
35. Letter from Gov. Schwarzenneger to Members of the Cal. State Senate, Veto
Message of S.B. 697 (Sept. 29, 2006), available at http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/press/sb_697_
veto.pdf.
36. See Complete Bill History, A.B. No. 1164, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-
08/bill/asm/ab_1151-1200/ab_1164_bill_20080114_history.html (last visited on Jan. 18,
2008); see also Concurrence in Senate Amendments, A.B. 1164,  http://www.leginfo.
ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_1151-1200/ab_1164_cfa_20070912_150325_asm_floor.
html (last visited Jan. 18, 2008).
37. See Complete Bill History, supra note 36.
38. Ill. Exec. Order 2005-1 (Feb. 18, 2005), available at www.illinois.gov/gov/pdf
docs/execorder2005-1.pdf.
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union.39  Six months after Blagojevich issued the order, legislation
was passed that made subsidized child-care providers public em-
ployees of the state, but solely for the purpose of collective
bargaining.40
A brewing conflict between the SEIU and the AFSCME finally
erupted after the governor’s executive order.  The SEIU main-
tained that it worked to organize Illinois’ child-care providers for
nine years prior to Blagojevich’s executive order.41  It alleged that
AFSCME entered into the scene much more recently, and in es-
sence was attempting to hijack the SEIU’s organizing campaign.42
During the election where the workers chose between the unions,
the AFL-CIO resolved the dispute by ordering AFSCME to shut
down its campaign.43  Following this decision, the SEIU announced
that it won the campaign, stating that it received 82% of the vote.44
In December 2005, the SEIU reached an agreement with the
state on its first contract.45  The contract was a thirty-nine month
deal that increased pay by 35%, and represented the first rate in-
crease in seven years for child-care workers in Illinois.46  Before
the negotiation, approximately 75% of the workers received reim-
bursement rates of $9.48 per child per day.47  Under the contract,
the reimbursement rate was raised to $10.48 starting on April 1,
2006, and will be raised again to $12.75 in July 2008.48  Addition-
ally, some of the workers will gain health-care benefits in the third
year of the contract, which will be paid out of a $27 million trust set
up by the state.49 The contract is estimated to cost Illinois approxi-
mately $250 million.50  The cost was estimated to fall within the
state’s budget targets for the first fifteen months.51
Following the lead of Illinois, Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski
signed two separate executive orders allowing for the organization
39. SEIU, Illinois Child Care Victory, http://www.seiu.org/public/child_care/il_
providers_unite.cfm (last visited Jan. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Child Care Victory].
40. See CHALFIE ET AL., supra note 32, at 13. R
41. Francine Knowles, Child-care Union Ruling Comes Before Vote Count, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Mar. 28, 2005, at 65.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. See Child Care Victory, supra note 39. R
45. See Francine Knowles, Tentative First Contract Reached for Home Child Care
Workers, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005, at 91.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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of child-care workers.52  The first order, issued in October 2005,
applied to approximately 4500 workers, and the second order, is-
sued in February 2006, applied to approximately 6000 child-care
workers, though the latter applied only to unregulated subsidized
workers.53  The two executive orders determine bargaining units by
regulatory status.54  AFSCME represented the first group of work-
ers, and the SEIU represented the latter group.55
AFSCME secured a contract with the state for the child-care
workers on September 30, 2006.56  The contract provided for an
increase in subsidy payments, incorporated a grievance procedure,
and also included a seventeen-point “Providers Bill of Rights.”57
Similarly, in February 2007, the SEIU signed a contract that pro-
vided for increased subsidy rates for its workers.58
In Iowa, Governor Tom Vilsack issued two executive orders in
January 2006, the first ordering the state’s Department of Human
Services (“DHS”) to meet with a representative of 6000 regulated
child-care workers, and the second ordering the agency to meet
with the representative of 7000 unregulated subsidized workers.59
Neither of the two orders established the workers as state employ-
ees, and both required the DHS to meet and confer with their rep-
resentatives to discuss issues such as reimbursement rates and
healthcare benefits.60
In August 2006, New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine also signed
an executive order granting collective bargaining rights to child-
care workers.61  The order granted formal recognition to the Child
Care Workers Union, a partnership between CWA and
AFSCME.62  Unlike Iowa’s executive order that was silent on the
workers’ employee status, the New Jersey order explicitly stated
that the child-care workers were not state employees.63
Finally, in the most recent instance before Governor Spitzer’s
Executive Order No. 12, Wisconsin Governor James Doyle issued
52. See CHALFIE ET AL., supra note 32, at 16. R
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. See Oregon Child Care Providers Achieve Landmark Contract, AFSCME
WORKS ONLINE XTRAS, Oct. 10, 2006, www.afscme.org/publications/12393.cfm.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See CHALFIE ET AL., supra note 32, at 18. R
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id.
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an executive order in October 2006 that allowed subsidized and
unsubsidized child-care workers to unionize and negotiate with the
state.64  Shortly thereafter, AFSCME was certified to represent the
workers.65  Like Corzine’s executive order in New Jersey, Doyle’s
order made clear that it did not create an employer-employee rela-
tionship between the state and the child-care workers.66
The organizing campaigns associated with the five executive or-
ders demonstrate that unions are willing to commit a wealth of re-
sources toward organizing this vast field of potential members.
The commitment evinced by AFSCME and SEIU in organizing
child-care workers in these states illustrates the importance they
attach to this new constituency.  For example, the SEIU dedicated
a significant amount of time, effort, and resources in attempting to
change the political climate in Illinois and convince Governor Rod
Blagojevich to issue an executive order that enabled SEIU to or-
ganize and represent tens of thousands of child-care providers in
the state.67  Each successful attempt yielded valuable new mem-
bers, and while the additions vary from just a few thousand new
members up to 49,000 in Illinois, the unions have clearly found the
additions worth the expenditure of a significant amount of
resources.68
The manner in which child-care workers gained collective bar-
gaining rights in these states also illustrates a trend in their path
toward unionization.  In each of the five states, a grassroots cam-
paign culminated in the issuance of an executive order.  While
there was some significant variation in provisions of the five execu-
tive orders, such as New Jersey’s explicit wording that child-care
workers were not state employees compared to Iowa’s silence on
the issue, each order achieved the overall goal of granting collec-
tive bargaining rights to child-care workers.69
Executive orders by state governors have proven an effective
means of granting significant improvements to the nation’s subsi-
dized child-care workers, especially when analogous legislation
64. Id. at 19.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Jeff Crosby, Can Anything Good Come from This?, NEW LAB. F., Apr. 1,
2006, at 29 (“SEIU contributed more than $800,000 to the campaign of Democrat
Rod Blagojevich, which helped convince Governor Blagojevich to issue an executive
order allowing SEIU to represent tens of thousands of home child care providers in
collective bargaining with the state.”).  Earlier, the SEIU used a similar strategy in
California to gain the right to represent 70,000 home care workers. Id.
68. See Knowles, supra note 45. R
69. See CHALFIE ET AL., supra note 32, at 18. R
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often runs into a formidable share of obstacles.  These orders have
given a traditionally underrepresented labor segment a voice in de-
termining the course of their profession and demonstrated that is it
possible for a group of workers who had faced almost insuperable
obstacles to unionize and secure significant improvements in their
wages, terms, and conditions of employment.
As discussed in the next Section, this success encouraged the cur-
rent New York state administration to use the executive order ap-
proach after unsuccessful legislative attempts to secure the
unionization of child-care providers.
III. UNIONIZATION OF CHILD-CARE PROVIDERS IN NEW YORK
A. Governor Pataki’s 2006 Veto of Legislation Recognizing
Home Day-care Providers as Employees
Able to Unionize
On February 15, 2006, New York State Senator Nicholas A.
Spano, a Yonkers republican, introduced Senate Bill 6758,70 enti-
tled, “An act to amend the civil service law and the labor law, in
relation to the inclusion of certain home day care providers as em-
ployees covered by the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act
and the New York State Labor Relations Act.”  The purpose of the
bill was to categorize and include home day-care providers as em-
ployees within the meaning of these statutes.71
The bill would have amended the Civil Service Law to deem
home-based child day-care providers who are paid from funds of
the City of New York, any county, or by the State, to be employees
“solely of the State of New York.”72  Such home day-care providers
would be considered public employees solely for purposes of the
Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (“Taylor Law”), which
would permit them to organize and be represented for collective
bargaining purposes.73  Furthermore, the bill would have amended
the Taylor Law and the State Labor Relations Act to ensure that
“these providers would be part of a single, separate negotiating
unit when determining representation status.”74  The bill would
have afforded such employees the same statutory right currently
70. S.B. 6758, 229th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2006).
71. See Sen. Nick Spano, Introducer’s Memorandum in Support, N.Y. Bill Jacket,
2006 S.B. 6758 (June 7, 2006) [hereinafter Introducer’s Memorandum].
72. Governor of N.Y., Veto No. 215, N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2006 S.B. 6758 (June 7,
2006) [hereinafter N.Y. Veto No. 215].
73. Id.
74. Id.
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provided to public employees to organize and be represented by a
union, and to collectively negotiate terms of employment with the
State.
The purpose of the bill was to provide a legal mechanism for
family day-care providers, both licensed and license-exempt, to be
represented by organized labor.75  This would give family day-care
providers a collective voice and representation in the State’s child-
care assistance program, help ensure quality care, facilitate higher
standards for the children and families served, and improve the de-
livery of services.76  Organized labor would help day-care providers
comply with state agency rules and regulations and assist them in
carrying out their child-care responsibilities.77
On March 28, 2006, the Senate unanimously passed the bill.78
On April 26, 2006, the Assembly passed the bill by a vote of 100 to
33.79  On June 7, 2006, however, Governor Pataki vetoed the
legislation.80
His veto letter to the Senate opined that the legislation would
inappropriately create an artificial framework, whereby such
home-care providers “are deemed to be State employees, despite
the fact that the State is not their employer, has no direct relation-
ship with them, and does not establish or supervise the terms and
conditions of employment.”81
The Governor argued that the use of collective bargaining to
regulate child day-care subsidy payments is “inconsistent with fed-
eral requirements governing New York’s receipt of approximately
$315 million in federal Child Care and Development Block Grant
Funding.”82  Both the Office of Children and Family Services and
the New York Public Welfare Association urged disapproval of the
legislation for this reason.83  Governor Pataki claimed that the leg-
islation would jeopardize the vitally needed federal funds.84
Although Governor Pataki did not explicitly mention the Divi-
sion of the Budget Recommendation on the legislation, he seem-
75. See Introducer’s Memorandum, supra note 71. R
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Sen. Nick Spano, N.Y. Bill Tracking, N.Y.S.B. 6758 (2006) [hereinafter Spano,
Bill Tracking].
79. Id.
80. See N.Y. Veto No. 215, supra note 72. R
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Division of the Budget Recommendation on S.B. 6758, N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2006
S.B. 6758 (June 7, 2006) [hereinafter Division of the Budget Recommendation].
84. See N.Y. Veto No. 215, supra note 72. R
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ingly relied heavily on the information the Division of the Budget
provided to him.  The Division of the Budget also reminded Gov-
ernor Pataki that the Public Employee Relations Board had raised
concerns about the bill, the Office of Children and Family Services
strongly opposed the legislation,85 and The New York State Associ-
ation of Counties also opposed the bill.86
According to Governor Pataki, the bill was “an extreme expan-
sion of the definition of public employee under the Taylor Law.”87
Under the bill, home day-care providers would be considered em-
ployees of New York State for collective bargaining purposes only,
despite the fact that “such individuals are in no way State employ-
ees, as the State has no direct relationship with these providers.”88
The State’s “role as the regulator of child-care and as administrator
of the State’s Child Care Block Grant (“CCBG”) is limited to allo-
cating Federal and State funding to local social services districts
through the CCBG.”89  Pataki also argued that the State of New
York has no influence regarding the hours or days a provider
chooses to work, the fees the provider chooses to charge, or the
employees the provider chooses to hire.”90  As such, any existing
employment relationship would be between the home day care
provider and the parent of the child.91
The Governor also argued that the bill would produce considera-
ble unbudgeted costs, and could lead to less availability of child-
care to both subsidized and non-subsidized families.92  Since the
bill would provide nearly 85,00093 home day-care providers with
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.  The Division of the Budget Recommendation emphasized that the Rhode
Island Superior Court had ruled that Rhode Island’s family day-care providers were
not state employees, pointing out that the state does not hire the providers, and dis-
tinguished between the state’s regulatory authority for public health and safety rea-
sons and the type of control required to create an employer-employee relationship.
See State ex rel. Dept. of Human Servs. v. State Labor Relations Bd., No. C.A. 04-
1899, 2005 WL 3059297, at *7 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005).
91. See N.Y. Veto No. 215, supra note 72. R
92. Id.
93. See Division of the Budget Recommendation, supra note 83.  The total num- R
ber of child-care providers that would have been affected by the proposed legislation
appeared questionable.  Opponents of the bill cited numbers that ranged from 54,000
to 85,000. Id. (estimating the number of potentially affected child-care providers to
be around 85,000); see also Letter from Mark Alesse, State Director of The Voice of
Small Business, to Richard Platkin, Counsel to the Governor, in opposition to S.B.
6758, N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2006 S.B. 6758 (June 1, 2006) (“By signing this law, Governor
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union representation, the potential subsequent pressure to increase
subsidy payments to this population could compel local service dis-
tricts to take on additional unfunded costs.94  The Governor con-
tended that “[s]tate and [f]ederal funding are provided to localities
as a block grant;” therefore, “an increase in subsidy payments
would result in either increased local cost, or a decreased number
of children served.”95  At the time the legislation was vetoed, “$400
million [was] paid to in-home providers in the form of child-care
subsidies.”96  The Governor also argued that if a 3% increase in the
costs was assumed, an additional $12 million would be needed to
cover the costs of publicly funded child-care in the first year
alone.97  In addition, supposing that these providers would eventu-
ally receive benefits comparable to other state employees, the bill
could eventually cost the State over $100 million per annum.98
Further, Governor Pataki argued that “[n]egotiating child day
care subsidy payments through collective bargaining [was] inconsis-
tent with federal requirements and could jeopardize approximately
$315 million in federal funding allocated to New York State.”99
Additionally, the bill could endanger the State’s use of federal
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (“TANF”) dollars for
child-care, as such use cannot conflict with federal rules.100
The Governor also questioned why the bill treated regulated and
unregulated providers differently upstate than they are treated in
New York City.101  Furthermore, the Governor noted that “regu-
lated upstate providers are only included in the amendments to the
Labor Law section of the bill,” while “[t]he other providers are
included in the amendments to the Civil Service Law.”102  Gover-
nor Pataki also expressed concern about who would be deemed the
employer for the regulated upstate providers, as the Taylor Law
would not pertain to them.103
The Governor also relied on the arguments outlined in a letter
that The Business Council of New York State, Inc., sent to Richard
Pataki would, by statute, automatically make some 54,000 workers full-time state em-
ployees . . . .”).
94. See N.Y. Veto No. 215, supra note 72. R
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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Platkin, the Counsel to the Governor, where the Council noted
that New York already has more public employees, relative to the
population, than most other states.104  The letter even called the
bill an example of a syndrome persistent in New York where the
State’s political culture often “serves the interests of those who get
paid to provide public services, more than it does the people who
are the ostensible beneficiaries of such services.”105  Across upstate
New York, “high numbers of public-sector jobs and above-average
compensation for those jobs cost taxpayers an extra $4 billion each
year, compared to the cost in a normal state.”106  Additionally, the
letter emphasized that the bill was sponsored by an influential pub-
lic-employee union, the United Federation of Teachers (“UFT”),107
and claimed that the proposed legislation would benefit the union
by increasing the amount of UFT dues-payers by over 52,000
individuals.108
Similarly, the New York State Office of Children and Family Ser-
vices (“OCFS”) also sent Richard Platkin a letter that urged Gov-
ernor Pataki to veto the bill and included arguments listed in the
Division of the Budget’s recommendation.109  The OCFS was con-
cerned that by establishing an employer-employee relationship be-
tween the State and the providers, the State also might be
considered liable for “the safety of the home, the providers and the
children.”110  This could dramatically increase the potential fiscal
liability of the State.111
According to OCFS, the bill does not account for how the State
would meet the requirements of the Public Employees’ Fair Em-
ployment Act, which call for the State to collect membership dues
deductions in accordance with section 208 of the Civil Service Law
and pay the collected funds to the employee organization.112  The
104. Letter from The Business Council of New York State, Inc., to Richard Platkin,
Counsel to the Governor, N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2006 S.B. 6758 (June 7, 2006).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Letter from N.Y. State Office of Children and Family Services to Richard
Platkin, Counsel to the Governor, N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2006 S.B. 6758 (June 7, 2006)
[hereinafter OCFS Letter to the Governor].  It appears that the Division of the
Budget’s recommendations relied heavily on the OCFS letter to the governor, or one
sent directly to them by OCFS, since the language used is exactly the same and much
more detailed than the Division of the Budget. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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State simply did not have any mechanism in place to fulfill these
requirements.113
The OCFS letter also noted that making certain regulated home
day-care providers State employees under section 201 of the Civil
Service Law would be problematic when the State sought to police
the regulated providers for failing to abide by regulatory provisions
that apply to all regulated programs, not merely those that care for
children receiving subsidies.114  Questions would likely arise as to
“whether the enforcement action for these providers, as State em-
ployees, would be subject to the rules on employee grievances and
the settling of labor disputes,” rather than the “usual day care en-
forcement proceedings.”115  Furthermore, the OCFS letter pointed
to the fact that section 2 under rule 6.2 of the bill would amend
section 701(3) of the Labor Law by adding a new paragraph (c)
which would provide “that regulated home day care providers serv-
ing children whose care is funded by localities outside of the City
of New York are deemed to be in a single, separate negotiating
unit.  Section 701 of the Labor Law governs whom the State Labor
Relations Act covers.”116  The OCFS letter, however, noted that
section 715 of the Labor Law “provides that the State Labor Rela-
tions Act does not apply to employees of the State or to any politi-
cal or civil subdivision of the State.  Therefore, it is unclear who
would be considered the employer of upstate regulated home day
care providers under the State Labor Relations Act, since it could
not be the State or a county” under section 715 of the Labor
Law.117
Obviously, many labor unions, including the New York State
United Teachers (“NYSUT”), CSEA, the New York State AFL-
CIO, AFSCME, and the UFT, filed letters in support of the legisla-
tion.118  The most compelling and extensive letter in support was
that submitted by NYSUT.
NYSUT’s letter stated that over forty years of research “demon-
strated that quality early childhood education results in greater ac-
ademic achievement throughout ones [sic] educational
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2006 S.B. 6758 (June 7, 2006).  These letters for the un-
ions appeared to be not as extensive as the letters from the groups that opposed the
bill.
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experiences.”119  The earlier one starts an educational experience,
the greater the participation as model citizens in the community.120
Thus, “investment in the quality and stability of early childcare
workers correlates with better social and academic outcomes for
children.”121  The NYSUT letter also emphasizes that the bill
would ensure that those who take care of the youngest, and often
poorest and neediest children are finally treated with dignity and
respect.122
Nevertheless, Governor Pataki vetoed the bill on June 7, 2006.
On June 23, 2006, the Senate overwhelmingly overrode his veto, 57
to 4.123  The Assembly, however, never voted on whether to over-
ride Governor Pataki’s veto.124
As discussed in the next Section, the new administration decided
to bypass the legislative process and implement the reform through
Governor Spitzer’s executive order.
B. Governor Spitzer’s Executive Order
On May 8, 2007, the newly elected Democrat, Governor Eliot
Spitzer, signed Executive Order No. 12.125  The executive order es-
sentially does what the bill vetoed a year earlier by Governor
Pataki sought to accomplish.126  Before introducing the executive
order, Governor Spitzer noted that “child-care providers should be
119. Letter from NYSUT to Governor George E. Pataki, N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2006
S.B. 6758 (June 7, 2006).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Danny Hakim, Albany Ready to Give Union Rights to 52,000 Day Care Work-
ers, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2006, at B1; see also Spano, Bill Tracking, supra note 78.
124. See Spano, Bill Tracking, supra note 78; see also Hearing on A.B. 1164 Before
the Cal. Assemb. Comm. on Labor and Employment, 2007-2008 Assembly 11 (N.Y.
2007), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_1151-1200/ab_1164_cfa
_20070417_101101_asm_comm.html.
125. See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 12, supra note 2. R
126. The reasons why the Governor did not await legislation are probably woven
into the complex relationship between the leadership of the legislature and Governor
Spitzer. See Nicholas Confessore, Spitzer Accused of Bruno Insult, N.Y. TIMES, July
8, 2007, at A24 (“Mr. Bruno and Mr. Spitzer, 48, have been on poor terms since the
end of the legislative session in June, with each blaming the other for a list of unfin-
ished bills, including some of the governor’s top priorities.”); see also Nicholas Con-
fessore, A Mellower Spitzer Emerges, Playing Down Bruno Feud, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2007, at B3; Clyde Haberman, Memo to Spitzer:  No One Likes a Bully, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2007, at B1; Danny Hakim & Nicholas Confessore, Spitzer Aides Cited for Use
of Police to Tarnish Bruno, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2007, at A1.  Incidentally, a year
earlier, when Spitzer was not governor but Attorney General of the State of New
York, he declined to officially comment to the Counsel to Governor on the earlier
legislation; according to then-Attorney General Spitzer, the legislation did not relate
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given the option to organize themselves and select representatives
for the purpose of discussing with the State the conditions of their
employment, the stability, funding and operation of child-care pro-
grams, and the expansion of quality child care.”127
Executive Order No. 12 divides the child-care providers,
into four representation units:  (1) all child care providers in
New York City who are paid from funds administered by New
York City pursuant to Social Service Law § 410-u; (2) all regis-
tered or licensed child care providers in New York City who are
not paid from funds administered by New York City pursuant to
Social Service Law § 410-u; (3) all registered or licensed child
care providers outside New York City; and (4) all child care
providers outside New York City who provide child care in a
residence to one or more children who are receiving child care
assistance under Title 5-C of the Social Service Law under cir-
cumstances where the provider to be licensed or registered
under Social Service Law § 390.128
The executive order also provides that “New York State shall
recognize as the representative of the child care providers . . . such
representative as is designated by a majority of providers in the
unit.”129  Furthermore, it states that “any prospective representa-
tive may demonstrate majority designation by submitting authori-
zation cards approving representation, signed within twelve
months of their submission by the majority of providers comprising
the unit, to the State Employment Relations Board or any succes-
sor agency.”130  The State Employment Relations Board (“SERB”)
will then review the cards and, if it determines that they constitute
at least 51% of the providers in the unit at issue, it shall then “cer-
tify the party making the application as the designated representa-
tive of that unit.”131  If SERB determines, however, that the cards
constitute at least 30% but not 50% of the providers in that unit,
“it shall conduct an election in a manner directed by SERB, consis-
tent with its standard election procedures, to determine if the ma-
jority of members designate the prospective representative.”132
to the functions of the Department of Law. See Office of the Attorney General Com-
ment on S.B. 6758,  N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2006 S.B. 6758 (June 7, 2006).
127. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 12, supra note 2. R
128. Id. ¶ 2.
129. Id. ¶ 3.
130. Id. ¶ 4.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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The executive order expressly states that nothing in the order
permits “the child care providers collectively to engage in any
strike or work action to secure any right or privilege from the
State.”133  The executive order does not render the child-care prov-
iders state officers or employees.134  Moreover, it does not imply
that there exists “any employer-employee relationship between the
child care operator and the State . . . for any purpose, including but
not limited to any public retirement system, membership in any
public health insurance program, unemployment insurance, work-
ers’ compensation, disability coverage, New York Civil Service
Law, or indemnification under New York Public Officers Law.”135
Furthermore, the executive order provides that it in no way inter-
feres “with the existing relationship between consumers and the
child care providers, including the existing rights of parents or
guardians to choose their own provider, or to terminate that pro-
vider’s services at any time.”136  It also disavows that it creates “any
contractual rights or obligations.”137
Governor Spitzer’s executive order is comparable, though not
identical, to the analogous executive orders in Illinois, Oregon,
Iowa, New Jersey, and Wisconsin.  At the same time, all five execu-
tive orders differ in terms of what rights they grant child-care
workers, how they categorize the workers, and whether the state
deems the workers to be state employees.138
One of the most profound differentiations of Executive Order
No. 12 from prior orders is that New York delineates that the child-
care workers are not state employees.  While some prior orders
took similar stances, such as Illinois’s order that deemed workers
state employees solely for purposes of collective bargaining,139
others, such as Governor Corzine’s order in New Jersey, were
more stringent in stating that the workers were in no way state
employees.140
Similarly, Governor Spitzer’s order categorizes child-care prov-
iders in a different manner from prior executive orders.  New
133. Id. ¶ 11(a).
134. Id. ¶ 11(b).
135. Id.
136. Id. ¶ 11(d).
137. Id. ¶ 11(f).
138. See CHALFIE ET AL., supra note 32, at 13-14, 16-19 (summarizing and compar- R
ing new rights created by the five governor-issued executive orders pertaining to
home-based child-care providers).
139. Id. at 13.
140. Id. at 18.
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York’s order divides the workers into “four representation
units.”141  These divisions take into account both regulatory status
and the location of the workers.  Other executive orders, such as
that of Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski, divide the child-care
workers into segments for bargaining and union representation
based solely on regulatory status.142
In its introduction, the New York executive order recites a litany
of justifying reasons, using language very similar to that employed
by the major labor unions when they unsuccessfully lobbied Gover-
nor Pataki to sign the earlier legislation.143  For example, Governor
Spitzer’s executive order states that child-care providers “perform
an essential service for working parents and guardians in this state
by creating a safe, enjoyable and educational home-like environ-
ment for their children.”144  According to Governor Spitzer, it is
important to empower child-care providers to participate in the de-
cision-making on issues that impact the manner in which they de-
liver their services since child-care workers receive compensation
and benefits that are not “commensurate with the value of the
work they perform.”145  This, in turn, will create a “framework for
child-care providers to secure representation [that] can help im-
prove the environment in which they work, their benefits, and the
funding that they receive.146
As discussed in the next Section, Governor Spitzer’s executive
order will certainly result in a large-scale unionization of home-
based child-care workers throughout New York.147
C. Labor Turf Truces, Coalitions, and Organizing Initiatives
Before and After Executive Order No. 12
Organizing drives have been underway in New York for some
years, antedating both the legislation vetoed by Governor Pataki in
2006, and Governor Spitzer’s executive order in 2007.148  Grass-
141. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 12, supra note 2, ¶ 2. R
142. CHALFIE ET AL., supra note 32, at 16. R
143. See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 12, supra note 2, at 1-2. R
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Steven Greenhouse, Child Care Workers Get Right to Unionize, N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 2007, at A1, [hereinafter Greenhouse, Right to Unionize] available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/05/12/nyregion/12childcare.html; Spitzer Signs Executive Or-
der Giving Union Rights to Home-Based Child-Care Providers, UFT, May 11, 2007,
www.uft.org/news/child-care/.
148. VOICE, CSEA, http://www.voicecsea.org/what_is_voice.php (last visited Jan.
18, 2008); UFT, http://www.uftproviders.org/about_us (last visited Jan. 18, 2008).
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roots organizing and coalition building have persistently pressured
the New York legislature to pass legislation facilitating child-care
worker organization.149  In New York City, the Association of
Community Organizations for Reform Now (“ACORN”) and the
UFT have been allies in the struggle to organize New York City’s
child-care workers.150  The CSEA’s child-care worker component,
Voice of Organized Child-care Educators (VOICE), was formed by
a group of Schenectady child-care workers in 2002, who joined the
CSEA in order to organize.151  In the spring of 2005, UFT/ACORN
officially launched their organizing campaign in New York City.152
After Governor Pataki vetoed the legislation, the interested un-
ions and their coalitions urged the legislature to override the veto,
which never materialized.153
Governor Spitzer, keeping a campaign promise, signed the exec-
utive order, clearing the legal path for unionization.154  Meanwhile,
however, the grassroots organizing campaigns had not been dor-
mant.  UFT/ACORN organized rallies and marches, and engaged
in door to door organizing to solicit card signatures from child-care
workers.155  With the overwhelming vote of New York City child-
care providers in favor of unionization, the teachers’ union will
now have formal authorization to act as the bargaining representa-
tive for all 28,000 providers in New York City.156
149. See Natalie Bell, Let’s Get Organized, UFT PROVIDERS, Nov. 16, 2006, http://
www.uftproviders.org/news/let_s_get_organized; Diedre McFadyen, Home Daycare
Workers to Governor:  Sign the Bill!, UFT PROVIDERS, http://www.uftproviders.org/
news/home_daycare_workers_to_governor (last visited Jan. 18, 2008).
150. See, e.g., New York ACORN and UFT Organize Childcare Providers, ACORN
NEWS, Aug. 22, 2005, http://www.acorn.org/index.php?id=9646; Zero to Three, New
York Gives Home-based Child-care Providers the Right to Unionize, BABY MONITOR,
June 11, 2007, http://www.zerotothree.org/site/PageServer?pagename=ter_pub_BM_
06_11_07.
151. See Press Release, CSEA Local 1000, CSEA Wants Union Representation for
Day Care Workers (June 6, 2006), http://www.csealocal1000.org/2006press.php#jun_6_
06; see also VOICE, supra note 148; UFT, supra note 148. R
152. See VOICE, supra note 148; see also Diedre McFadyen, Birth of a Union, R
UFT, Sept. 8, 2005 (on file with author).
153. See, e.g., Press Release, CSEA Local 1000, CSEA, NYSUT Urge Veto Over-
ride on Union Representation Bill for Child-Care Workers (June 14, 2006), http://
www.csealocal1000.org/2006press.php#jun_14_06.
154. See, e.g., Greenhouse, Vote to Unionize, supra note 1; A Marriage of Missions, R
UFT, May 24, 2007, www.uft.org/news/teacher/president/a_marriage_of_missions/
print.html.
155. UFT Providers, Door-to-Door Union Drive Exceeds Goal, http://www.uft
providers.org/news/door_to_door_union_drive_exceeds_goal (last visited Jan. 18,
2008).
156. See Greenhouse, Vote to Unionize, supra note 1. R
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One labor scholar attributes this successful cross-state, inter-
union cooperation to the AFL’s New Alliance Strategy.157  Under
the New Alliance, first unveiled in 1999, local labor unions were to
be reorganized to allow central management by Central Labor
Committees.158  The goals were to improve the communication and
the efficiency of organizational drives and leverage political power
more effectively.159  New York was the first state to implement the
New Alliance in 2001.160
The disaffiliation of the Change to Win Coalition member un-
ions in 2005 and 2006 changed the landscape of organized labor,
and temporarily caused a potentially fratricidal conflict over home
and child-care workers.161  There was no evidence, however, of any
Change to Win encroachment into the New York child-care
arena.162  Local 1199, the SEIU’s and the nation’s largest local
union, rejoined the NYC Central Labor Council in late 2005.163
Local 1199 organized New York City’s home-care workers, so it
was a potential contender for the right to represent the City’s child-
care workers as well.164
157. Jeff Grabelsky, A New Alliance in New York State:  A Progress Report on the
Labor Movement’s Restructering, Capacity Building, and Programmatic Work, 10
WORKINGUSA:  J. LAB. & SOC’Y 9, 19-20 (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.
blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1743-4580.2006.00137.x.
158. Id. at 13.
159. Id. at 17-20.
160. Harry Kelber, Union Leader of 2.2 Million Tells Why ‘New Alliance’ Is Essen-
tial, INSIDE THE AFL-CIO, June 5, 2001, http://www.laboreducator.org/inside12.htm
161. In 2005 the Change to Win group splintered off from the AFL-CIO, and prom-
ised more aggressive unionizing. See Thomas B. Edsall, Two Top Unions Split from
AFL-CIO, WASH. POST, July 26, 2005, at A01.
162. See generally Greenhouse, Providers May Vote, supra note 4; Greenhouse, R
Vote to Unionize, supra note 1; Townsend, supra note 4. R
163. See Posting of Doug Cunningham to Workers Independent News, http://www.
laborradio.org/node/1767 (Oct. 25, 2005, 18:31 EST).
164. See, e.g., 1199SEIU, Homecare Workers, http://www.1199seiu.org/members/
occupations/homecare/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 18, 2008).  It is worth noting that
Local 1199’s acrimonious relationship with the Spitzer administration suggests that
the Governor’s executive order was signed with the Governor’s knowledge that 1199
was not planning on playing a part in the organizing of child-care providers. See, e.g.,
Steven Greenhouse, Long Climb for New President of Health Care Workers’ Union,
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2007, at B2; Danny Hakim, Firing Off Another Round Over
Health Care Budget Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2007/03/05/nyregion/05empire.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.  If 1199 did attempt to
capitalize on the new executive order, it would probably create massive political fall-
out with the Governor and with the UFT.  In the interests of labor peace, it would be
foolhardy for 1199, or any other major Change to Win affiliate, to directly challenge
the apparently solid agreement between CSEA and UFT without risking a repeat of
the AFSCME-SEIU raiding wars. See Posting of Cunningham, supra note 163 and R
accompanying text.
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In early August 2007, the New York State Employment Rela-
tions Board approved plans for the United Federation of Teachers
to organize 28,000 home-based child-care providers in New York
City.165  Working in alliance with the UFT, ACORN collected
12,000 signatures from the 28,000 home child-care providers in the
City, supporting unionization, well above the 30% affirmative
showing necessary to begin the unionization process.  From Sep-
tember 5 through October 18, the child-care providers mailed in
ballots to the New York State Employment Relations Board.166
From the 28,000 providers eligible to vote, 8382 voted to unionize,
while only 96 voted against unionizing.167  Because the majority of
those who voted were in favor of unionization, the vote was bind-
ing upon all 28,000 child-care workers in New York City.168
In late October 2007, “in the largest successful organizing drive
in New York City in half a century, 28,000 child-care providers . . .
join[ed] the city’s teachers’ union . . . .  This was the largest success-
ful unionization campaign in the city since 1960, when 45,000
teachers joined the United Federation of Teachers.”169
Meanwhile, CSEA plans to organize the additional 32,000 home
child-care providers in the State outside New York City in what
can become one of the most significant expansions of union mem-
bership in the past half a century.170
At the announcement of Governor Spitzer’s executive order,
one child-care provider claimed that hearing the order was “like a
hundred birthday parties all at the same time.”171  As discussed in
the next Section, such enthusiasm, while warranted, does not fully
reflect all possible implications of the executive order.
D. Likely Ramifications of Executive Order No. 12
Unless and until there are accurate assessments of the costs and
benefits of the New York experience, it is unlikely that other gov-
ernors will emulate Governor Spitzer’s executive order.  The re-
cord demonstrates that home-care providers’ minima earnings are
completely disproportionate to the valuable services they provide
165. See Greenhouse, Vote to Unionize, supra note 1. R
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Dan Gursky, New York Order Gives Green Light to Child Care Union Drive,
AFT, May 14, 2007, http://www.aft.org/news/2007/ny-earlychild.htm.
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to working parents.172  If the inexorable cost increases begin to ap-
proach the crisis level forecasted by the opponents of the Gover-
nor’s initiative, state and local spending will increase dramatically
for those children whose care the government subsidizes.  This in
turn will result in yet another increase in already high New York
state and local taxes.  The Bloomberg administration has estimated
that the unionization of the home child-care providers in New York
City will cost the city an additional $100 million annually in in-
creased wages and benefits.173
The equally grim alternative is to reduce the number of subsi-
dized slots.  Many working parents may not be able to afford cost
increases when the home child-care providers’ compensation and
benefits go up, if their children’s home care is not subsidized by the
government.  If child-care costs become too high, many parents
may conclude that it simply does not pay to work and will choose
to stay home.
There could well be an economic and social gridlock looming
just over the horizon.  New York State, with its high taxes, is not an
ideal model for the future, especially in the economically chal-
lenged upstate counties.  There are, no doubt, thousands of other
low-wage workers and service providers living on the economic
margins, and their prospective unions, especially, watching with
great interest, as these events vis-a`-vis the home child-care provid-
ers unfold.
The implications of Governor Spitzer’s executive order are ap-
parent, particularly for the home-based child day-care providers,
their charges, and the labor movement.  Other ramifications may
be more subtle, such as unionization possibilities for the broader
class of child-care providers.  The executive order will change the
quality of child care in New York; whether for better or worse is an
open question.
In 2004, Professor Peggie Smith, a leading academic authority on
the broader dynamic of all family-care providers, described what
she viewed as a “child-care crisis,” resulting from a steady move-
ment of women with children into the workforce.174  This situation
led to increased demand for child-care services, combined with an
inadequate supply of affordable, quality care.175  She contended
that studies demonstrated that family child care was “mediocre”
172. Cf. supra note 6 and accompanying text.
173. See Greenhouse, Vote to Unionize, supra note 1. R
174. See Smith, Quality Child Care, supra note 5, at 399. R
175. Id.
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throughout the nation.176 She put forth several solutions, one of
which was the unionization of day-care providers for children.177
Smith stated that unionization stood to benefit the children being
cared for, citing studies that suggested when child-care workers are
treated with the respect and dignity she believed would come from
unionization, “they are more likely to provide quality care and to
remain in their jobs.”178
There are countervailing factors, however, that forecast a signifi-
cantly different, and bleak, picture for the change in the quality of
child care in New York resulting from the executive order.  In par-
ticular, while the order may increase the quality of care provided
by child-care providers, the number of potential recipients of such
care could be severely diminished.179
Analogously, parents forced out of utilizing a subsidized child-
care provider due to financial restraints as a result of the executive
order will have to find other methods of child care.  For example,
they may resort to unlicensed, unregistered child-care providers
who do not accept government subsidies.  Since these may be
child-care providers who, while legally subject to regulation, avoid
the regulatory system and “work as part of an underground econ-
omy,” they may provide a diminished quality of care.180  The conse-
quence is that more parents are forced into the unpalatable
position of employing such diminished, potentially dangerous, mar-
ginal child-care providers.
An additional potential consequence of Governor Spitzer’s exec-
utive order is that the state’s consent to the unionization of child-
care providers may encourage them to begin advocating for cover-
age by the state pension system with full pension benefits.181  Fur-
thermore, the employees might contend that they are also covered
by the disciplinary and job protection provisions applicable to pub-
lic employees under Article IV (Titles B and C) of the Civil Service
Law and are entitled to defense and indemnification under the
176. See Smith, Family Child Care Providers, supra note 5, at 330. R
177. See Smith, Quality Child Care, supra note 5, at 402. R
178. See id.
179. The day after Governor Spitzer signed the executive order, sources in New
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s administration expressed concerns about the
likely adverse impact upon the City and warned that 15,000 child-care spots were put
at risk as a result of the executive order, despite Mayor Bloomberg’s plan to increase
the number of available spots. See Greenhouse, Right to Unionize, supra note 147; R
Kenneth Lovett, Gov Gives Day-care Workers Union Label, N.Y. POST, May 12, 2007.
180. See Smith, Family Child Care Providers, supra note 5, at 332. R
181. See Division of the Budget Recommendation, supra note 83. R
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Public Officers Law.182  Lastly, “the State may also be  responsible
for other employment issues such as withholding taxes, unemploy-
ment insurance, workers’ compensation, pension, social security
and disability coverage.”183
The validity of such apprehensions is bolstered by looking at the
five executive orders that preceded New York’s, and noting how
they too acknowledged similar consequences.  Governor Corzine
clearly understood the risks of an employee-employer relationship
between the child-care workers and the state, and explicitly stated
that under his executive order, child-care workers were in no way
state employees.184  Similarly, Wisconsin Governor James Doyle
also made it clear in his order that he was not creating an em-
ployee-employer relationship between the workers and the state.185
Both of these actions indicate that these states anticipated the
same consequences as those indicated in the Division of the
Budget’s report to Pataki regarding Senate Bill 6758.186
Further, allowing the unionization of child-care providers could
have a domino effect, not only for the child-care providers, but also
for other situations where localities or individuals purchase ser-
vices from independent contractors in whole or in part with funds
provided by the state.  Some believe “health care providers who
treat Medicaid patients, and landlords who rent to tenants who re-
ceive rent subsidies or housing allowances, could advance similar
demands.”187  In sum, “administration of Medicaid or housing sub-
sidy funds by localities should not result in the State being deemed
the employer of the health care providers or the landlords.”188
The validity of a potential domino effect may again be derived
from observing the trends in those states that already embarked on
the path of granting collective bargaining rights by executive order.
In Illinois, unionization of child-care providers came after the
unionization of state subsidized home-care workers.189  The grant
of collective bargaining rights to child-care providers may be a logi-
cal step in the process that began with the unionization of subsi-
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See CHALFIE ET AL., supra note 32, at 18. R
185. Wis. Exec. Order No. 172 (2006), available at http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/
journal_media_detail.asp?locid=19&prid=2359 (last visited Jan. 18, 2008).
186. Division of the Budget Recommendation, supra note 83. R
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See CHALFIE ET AL., supra note 32, at 7. R
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dized home-care providers several years ago.190  It is a possibility
that this effect will spread to other fields, such as providers who
treat Medicaid patients, as more states continue to grant bargain-
ing rights to subsidized employees such as child-care providers.
Governor Spitzer’s executive order may lead to equal protection
issues since “there are numerous home child day care providers
whose clients pay the total cost of day care without any subsidized
assistance, and who would not be covered by this legislation.”191
Thus, the executive order will more likely benefit providers that
serve subsidized children than those that do not.192  At the same
time, the bill may “drive up the cost of child day care for all con-
sumers if the provision of employment benefits to self-employed
day care providers becomes the standard.”193
An evident result of the Governor’s executive order is that with
collective bargaining power, the remaining providers clearly will
improve their financial position.  This, however, will not necessarily
lead to radical changes for child-care providers.  Low wages are not
the only issue they face.  The executive order deliberately is not an
omnibus solution to the numerous problems plaguing the nation’s
child-care workers.  Governor Spitzer’s executive order, for exam-
ple, does not provide them with health-care benefits.194  Of the few
workers who have access to an employer’s health-care plan, even
fewer can actually afford the associated premiums.195  Although
the unionization, under the auspices of the executive order, likely
will not completely bridge the gap between the services provided
by child-care workers and their compensation, it is certainly the
first major step in that direction.
In the short term, as a practical matter of enhanced union politi-
cal power and an influx of additional union dues, the political lob-
bying activities of the CSEA and UFT may more closely reflect the
new membership body’s interest.  The unions and their coalition
allies may push for political action from Albany, not preempted by
the federal government, which would, in turn, better protect immi-
190. See, e.g., Greenhouse, Union Gains a Victory, supra note 13 (“[After w]inning R
the biggest unionization drive in more than half a century, the Service Employees
International Union gained the right today to represent 74,000 Los Angeles County
home-care workers who feed, bathe and clean for the elderly and disabled.”).
191. OCFS Letter to the Governor, supra note 109. R
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Peggie R. Smith, Laboring for Child Care:  A Consideration of New Ap-
proaches to Represent Low-Income Service Workers, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 583,
590 (2006).
195. Id.
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grant and minority working women.196  Strict enforcement of wage
and overtime statutes regardless of immigration status, ensuring
open access to health care, and passage and enforcement of anti-
discrimination legislation are examples of some issues that the un-
ions may more militantly advocate, enriched by the perspectives of
these newly-unionized women of color.
As a practical matter, the political and economic conditions in
New York may serve to complicate funding the wage increases that
the newly unionized child-care providers may see.  While Spitzer’s
executive order does not guarantee salary increases, unlike Senate
Bill 6758, wage increases are clearly the most imminent goal of the
newly unionized workers.197
Child-care subsidies in New York “already consume $900 million
in federal, state and local funds.”198  While Spitzer’s executive or-
der does not address the funding of the eventual wage hikes for
child-care providers, estimates can be derived from analyses on
Senate Bill 6758.  The Division of the Budget Recommendation es-
timated an annual additional cost of approximately $100 million
each year.199  Similarly, the Bloomberg administration predicted
that Senate Bill 6758 would have cost New York City alone “$55
million to $100 million a year.”200  In both cases, the sheer cost of
Spitzer’s executive order will result in a significant increase to a
budget that is already viewed as massive.  His justifications of such
a dramatic increase may fall upon deaf ears when viewed in light of
the already significant allocation of funding that goes toward subsi-
dized child care.
Additionally, Spitzer’s executive order followed a “first-year
budget that increased spending at more than three times the infla-
tion rate.”201  His critics have mounted charges against him that he
is unable, so far, to control the cost of running the government of
New York.202  His announcement of the executive order, and its
immediately apparent financial ramifications, only further
mounted criticism against the Governor.203  When funds eventually
are allocated to cover the increase in wages for child-care provid-
196. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. R
197. See Lovett, supra note 179. R
198. E.J. McMahon, Babying Unions:  Spitzer’s Day Care Disaster, N.Y. POST, May
15, 2007.
199. See Division of the Budget Recommendation, supra note 83. R
200. See McMahon, supra note 198. R
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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ers, this charged political climate may prove to be a significant im-
pediment for the already embattled governor.
On a strategic level, national ramifications of the executive order
upon the movement of child-care providers to unionize are much
more difficult to preliminarily assess.  It is one of the most impor-
tant questions facing organized labor and public law.  Only in New
Jersey, Iowa, Illinois, Washington, Michigan, Oregon, and Wiscon-
sin do home-based child-care providers have the right to union-
ize.204  In all these states except Michigan the right to organize
involved the issuance of an executive order by the governor.205
However, these recent successes for organized labor in several
states, including New York, do not necessarily indicate that there
will be unionization across the nation for child-care providers.
Concurrently, a collision may be brewing among various labor
unions’ organizing dynamics, public state-level prerogatives, and
antitrust law.  As a general principle, federal antitrust law prohibits
independent contractors from engaging in collective bargaining,
absent state action providing immunity to the prohibition.206  The
continuing argument over whether child-care providers are em-
ployees of the state or are—in fact if not in law—independent con-
tractors, and the default assumption that they are independent
contactors, brings this antitrust law factor prominently into the le-
gal and policy equations.  In the case of child-care providers, the
use of various tests to distinguish an employee from independent
contractor is too unpredictable to assure a favorable outcome for
child-care providers.207  While the state-action doctrine expressed
in Parker v. Brown208 allows a state to carve out immunities, losses
suffered by child-care workers, such as those in Rhode Island,
204. Press Release, National Women’s Law Center, Home-based Child Care Prov-
iders Finding Strength in Unions (Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.nwlc.org/details.cfm?id=
2987&section=newsroom.
205. See CHALFIE ET AL., supra note 32, at 18. R
206. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362-63 (1943) (finding that anticompetitive
activities may be entitled to state-action immunity if the state clearly articulated pol-
icy to allow anti-competitive conduct and provides active supervision of such conduct
undertaken by private parties).
207. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. R
208. 317 U.S at 350-51.
[N]othing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history . . . suggests
that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities
directed by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under
the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may consti-
tutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a
state’s control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress.
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show that providers should not assume this alternative would al-
ways turn out in their favor.209
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the result of the possible conflict between Governor
Spitzer’s executive order and federal antitrust laws is difficult to
predict, overall, Governor Spitzer’s order will certainly increase
the political clout of organized labor and enable New York child-
care providers to demand fair pay for their services.  At the same
time, it is far less certain whether this development will lead to
improvements in the quality of child-care services predicted by the
proponents of the reform.  Moreover, there are reasons to expect
that state and local governments will be unable to maintain afford-
able child-care services for working families at the current level.
Regardless of the outcome, however, the burden on the state tax-
payers will increase.
Id.  There is an understandable proliferation of law review articles on the ramifica-
tions of the state-action doctrine expressed in Parker v. Brown. See generally  Darren
Bush, Mission Creep:  Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities as Applied to Deregulated
Industries, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 761 (2006); Michal Dlouhy, Judicial Review as Midcal
Active Supervision:  Immunizing Private Parties from Antitrust Liability, 57 FORDHAM
L. REV. 403 (1988); John F. Hart, ‘Sovereign’ State Policy and State Action Antitrust
Immunity, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 535 (1988); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page,
State Action and the Meaning of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:  An Approach to
Hybrid Restraints, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 269 (2003); Richard Squire, Antitrust and the
Supremacy Clause, 59 STAN. L. REV. 77 (2006); Elizabeth Trujillo, State Action Anti-
trust Exemption Collides with Deregulation:  Rehabilitating The Foreseeability Doc-
trine, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 349 (2006).
209. See State ex rel. Dept. of Human Servs. v. State Labor Relations Bd., No. C.A.
04-1899, 2005 WL 3059297, at *8 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005) (holding that child-
care workers were independent contractors, not employees).
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